We study the role of communication in repeated games with private monitoring. We first show that without communication, the set of Nash equilibrium payoffs in such games is a subset of the set of ε-coarse correlated equilibrium payoffs (ε-CCE) of the underlying one-shot game. The value of ε depends on the discount factor and the quality of monitoring. We then identify conditions under which there are equilibria with "cheap talk" that result in nearly efficient payoffs outside the set ε-CCE. Thus, in our model, communication is necessary for cooperation.
Introduction
The proposition that communication is necessary for cooperation seems quite natural, even self-evident. Indeed, in the old testament story of the Tower of Babel, God thwarted the mortals' attempt to build a tower reaching the heavens merely by dividing the languages. The inability to communicate with each other was enough to doom mankind's building project. At a more earthly level, antitrust laws in many countries prohibit or restrict communication among firms. Again, the premise is that limiting communication limits collusion. Organizations seek to design internal communication protocols to improve performance. Many use subjective peer evaluations-nonverifiable communication among employees and managers-to compensate employees and it is felt that such schemes provide stronger incentives for hard work (cooperation).
Despite its self-evident nature, it is not clear how one may formally establish the connection between communication and cooperation. One option is to consider the effects of pre-play communication in one-shot games. This allows players to coordinate and even correlate their play in the game. 1 But in many games of interest, this does not What kinds of monitoring structures lead to this conclusion? Two conditions are needed. First, private signals should be rather noisy so that in the absence of communication, monitoring is poor. Second, private signals of players should be strongly correlated when they play efficient action profiles and less so otherwise. 4 The second condition is natural in many economic environments. In an earlier paper Awaya and Krishna (2016) , we explored a price-setting duopoly in which firms' sales were correlated in this manner and showed how this arose naturally because of randomness in consumers' search costs. Another class of situations in which the second condition is natural is the following. Suppose that players can play cooperatively-expend effort, contribute to a public good, or gather information-or play selfishly and free ride on other players. These choices result in noisy private signals about an unknown state of nature. The stochastic structure is such that when a player plays cooperatively, the signal is more informative about the state than if he or she were to play selfishly. In any such situation, the players' signals will be more correlated when all cooperate than when this is not the case. 5 This kind of structure is common to many economic situations of interest. For instance, Fleckinger (2012) and Deb et al. (2016) study a moral hazard situation in which agents' outputs are highly correlated when all agents work and less corelated if anyone then implies that the set of correlated equilibria coincides with the unique Nash equilibrium.
3 A classic example is Stigler's (1964) model of secret price cuts, where firms choose prices that are not observed by other firms. The prices (actions) then stochastically determine firms' sales (signals). Each firm observes only its own sales and must infer its rivals' actions only via these. 4 Example 2 below shows that communication does not help if the reverse is true, that is, if correlation actually increases following a deviation. 5 In Example 1 below, we provide a simple derivation of this structure.
shirks. Deb et al. study the role of communication-in the form of peer evaluationsin providing incentives. Similarly, Gromb and Martimort (2007) study the incentives of, say, two experts to gather information. When both experts expend effort, they learn more about a true state of the world than otherwise. This also results in the features outlined above. How exactly does communication facilitate cooperation in such settings? The basic idea is that players can monitor each other not only by what they "see"-the signals-but also by what they "hear"-the messages that are exchanged. But since the messages are just cheap talk-costless and unverifiable-one may wonder how these can be used for monitoring. We construct equilibria in which the messages are cross-checked to ensure truthful reporting of signals. Moreover, the cross-checking is sufficiently accurate so that deviating players find it difficult to lie effectively. These essential properties rely on the second condition on the monitoring structure mentioned above. We use these ideas to construct an equilibrium that is nearly efficient.
Our main result requires two steps. The first task is to find an effective bound on equilibrium payoffs that can be achieved without communication. But the model we study is that of a repeated game with private monitoring and there is no known characterization of the set of equilibrium payoffs. This is because with private monitoring, each player knows only his own history (of past actions and signals) and has only noisy information about the private histories of other players. Since players' histories are not commonly known, these cannot be used as state variables in a recursive formulation of the equilibrium payoff set. In Section 4, we borrow an equilibrium notion from algorithmic game theory-that of a coarse correlated equilibrium-and are able to relate (in Proposition 4.1) the Nash equilibrium payoffs of the repeated game to the coarse correlated equilibrium payoffs of the one-shot game. The notion of a coarse correlated equilibrium was introduced by Moulin and Vial (1978) . 6 The set of coarse correlated equilibria is larger than the set of correlated equilibria and so has less predictive power in one-shot games. But because it is very easy to compute, in some cases it is nevertheless useful in bounding the set of Nash equilibria, for instance, in congestion games (Roughgarden 2016 ). Here we show that it is useful in bounding the set of Nash equilibria of repeated games as well. Precisely, Proposition I.1. The set of Nash equilibrium payoffs of the repeated game without communication is a subset of the set of ε-coarse correlated equilibrium payoffs of the one-shot game.
The ε is determined by the discount factor and the monitoring structure of the repeated game, and we provide an explicit formula for this. When the monitoring quality is poor-it is hard for other players to detect a deviation-ε is small and the set of ε-coarse correlated equilibrium payoffs provides an effective bound to the set of equilibrium payoffs in the repeated game.
The second task is to show that with communication, equilibrium payoffs above the bound can be achieved. To show this, we construct a cooperative equilibrium explicitly in which, in every period, players publicly report the signals they have received (see Proposition 5.1). Players' reports are aggregated into a single score and the future course of play is completely determined by this summary statistic. Deviations result in low scores and trigger punishments with higher probability. The score function lets us construct an equilibrium with communication to be of a particularly simple trigger-strategy form. When signals are very informative about each other, the constructed equilibrium is nearly efficient.
We emphasize that the analysis in this paper is of a different nature than that underlying the so-called folk theorems (see Sugaya 2015) , which show that for a fixed monitoring structure, as players become increasingly patient, near-perfect collusion can be achieved in equilibrium. In this paper, we keep the discount factor fixed and change the monitoring structure so that the set of equilibria with communication is substantially larger than the set without. A difficulty here is that monitoring structures, which are stochastic mappings from actions to signals, are high-dimensional objects. We show, however, that only two easily computable parameters-one measuring how noisy the signals are and the other measuring how strongly correlated they are-suffice to identify monitoring structures for which communication is necessary for cooperation.
Related literature
The current paper builds on our earlier work (Awaya and Krishna 2016) , where we explored some of the same issues in the special context of Stigler's (1964) model of secret price cuts in a symmetric duopoly with noisy sales. This is, of course, the canonical example of a repeated game with private monitoring. Much of the analysis in our earlier paper, however, relied on the assumption that sales were (log-) normally distributed and that the two firms were symmetric. This paper considers general n-person finite games and general signal distributions. More importantly, the bound on payoffs without communication that is developed here is tighter than the bound constructed in the earlier paper as well as being easier to interpret. 7 Moreover, the construction of equilibria with communication is entirely different and does not rely on any symmetry among players. Finally, we show in this paper (see Example 2 below) that communication does not always help cooperation. Awaya (2014) explores some of the same issues in a repeated prisoners' dilemma in continuous time.
There is a vast literature on repeated games under different kinds of monitoring. Under perfect monitoring, given any fixed discount factor, the set of perfect equilibrium payoffs with and without communication is the same. Under public monitoring, again given any fixed discount factor, the set of (public) perfect equilibrium payoffs with and without communication is also the same. Thus, in these settings, communication does not affect the set of equilibria. 8 Compte (1998) and Kandori and Matsushima (1998) study repeated games with private monitoring that allow, as we do, for communication among players. In this setting, they show that the folk theorem holds: any individually rational and feasible outcome can be approximated as the discount factor tends to 1. These results are derived under specific assumptions about the detectability of deviations by other players and can be satisfied only if there are at least three players. This line of research has been pursued by others as well (see Aoyagi 2002 , Fudenberg and Levine 2007 , Zheng 2008 , and Obara 2009 ) in environments different from, and sometimes more general than, those of Compte (1998) and Kandori and Matsushima (1998) . Particularly related to the current paper is the work of Aoyagi (2002) and Zheng (2008) , who assume, as we do, that players' signals exhibit greater correlation when efficient actions are played than when actions are inefficient. All of these papers thus show that communication is sufficient for cooperation when players are sufficiently patient. But as Kandori and Matsushima (1998, p. 648 ; their italics) recognize, "One thing which we did not show is the necessity of communication for a folk theorem."
In a remarkable paper, Sugaya (2015) shows the surprising result that in very general environments, the folk theorem holds without communication. Thus, in fact, communication is not necessary for a folk theorem. Although Sugaya's result was preceded by folk theorems for some limiting cases where the monitoring was almost perfect or almost public, the generality of its scope was unanticipated.
Unlike the folk theorems, in our work we do not consider the limit of the set of equilibrium payoffs as players become arbitrarily patient. We study the set of equilibrium payoffs for a fixed discount factor. Key to our result is a method of bounding the set of payoffs without communication using the easily computable set of ε-coarse correlated equilibria. Pai et al. (2017) also develop a bound that depends on a measure of monitoring quality based on the computer-science notion of "differential privacy." But the bound so obtained applies to equilibrium payoffs with communication as well as those without, and so does not help distinguish between the two. Sugaya and Wolitzky (2017) find sufficient conditions under which the equilibrium payoffs with private monitoring are bounded by the equilibrium payoffs with perfect monitoring. This bound again applies whether or not there is communication and so is also unable to distinguish between the two. Spector (2018) shows that communication can be beneficial in a model of price competition with private monitoring. Firms see their own current sales, but, unlike in our model, can see other firms' sales with some delay. Communication is helpful in reducing this delay in monitoring. In our model, all communication is pure cheap talk: private signals remain so forever. Kandori (2003) establishes a folk theorem with communication in a repeated game with public monitoring. With public monitoring, the only useful communication concerns the privately known actions that players have taken. In equilibrium, such actions remain private when players randomize and the outcomes of these randomizations are known only to the player in question. Kandori shows how with private strategies and communication, a folk theorem may be established under weaker conditions than required when only public strategies are used. But again, this does not show the necessity of communication, since it is not known what can be achieved with private strategies without communication. Rahman (2014) derives a similar result in a duopoly model.
The role of communication in fostering cooperation has also been the subject of numerous experiments in varied informational settings. Of particular interest is the work of Ostrom et al. (1994, Chapter 7) , who find that in-play communication in repeated common-pool resource games leads to greater cooperation than does pre-play communication. In recent work, Aryal et al. (2018) study how public communication affects collusion among airlines.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section outlines the formal model of repeated games with private monitoring. To motivate the subsequent analysis, in Section 3 we present some of the main ideas, as well as some subtleties, by means of some simple examples. Section 4 analyzes the repeated game without communication, whereas Section 5 does the same with communication. The benefits of communication are established in Section 6. Section 7 concludes. Appendix A contains proofs omitted from Section 4 regarding the no-communication bound. Appendix B analyzes the score function that forms the basis of the equilibrium with communication that is constructed in Section 5.
Preliminaries
As mentioned in the Introduction, we study repeated games with private monitoring.
Stage game
The underlying game is defined by (I (A i Y i w i ) i∈I q), where I = {1 2 n} is the set of players, A i is a finite set of actions available to player i, and Y i is a finite set of signals that i may observe. The actions of all the players a ≡ (a 1 a 2 a n ) ∈ A ≡ × i A i together determine q(· | a) ∈ (Y ), a probability distribution over the signals of all players. 9 A vector of signals y ∈ Y is drawn from this distribution and player i observes only y i . Player i's payoff is then given by the function w i : A i × Y i → R so that i's payoff depends on other players' actions only via the induced signal distribution q(· | a). We refer to w i (a i y i ) as i's ex post payoff. 10 Prior to any signal realizations, the expected payoff of player i is then given by the function u i : A → R, defined by
We adopt the following notational conventions throughout: capital letters denote sets with typical elements denoted by lowercase letters. Subscripts denote players and unsubscripted letters denote vectors or cartesian products. Thus, x i ∈ X i and x = (x 1 x 2 x n ) ∈ X = × i X i . Also, x −i denotes the vector obtained after the ith component of x has been removed and (x i x −i ) denotes the vector where the ith component of x has been replaced by x i . Finally, (X) is the set of probability distributions over X.
10 This ensures that knowledge of one's ex post payoff does not carry any infomation beyond that in the signal. For instance, in Stigler's (1964) model, a firm's profits depend only on its own actions (prices) and its own signal (sales).
where
q(y i y −i | a). As usual, u ∞ denotes the sup-norm of u. In what follows, we merely specify the expected payoff functions u i , not the underlying ex post payoff functions w i . The latter can be derived from the former for generic signal distributions; specifically, as long as {q i (· | a) : a ∈ A} is a linearly independent set of vectors.
We refer to G ≡ (A i u i ) i∈I as the stage game. The set of feasible payoffs in G is F = co u(A), the convex hull of the range of u. A payoff vector v * ∈ F is (strongly) efficient if there does not exist a feasible v = v * such that v ≥ v * .
The collection {q(· | a)} a∈A is referred to as the monitoring structure. We suppose throughout that for all i, the marginal distribution over i's signals, q i (· | a) ∈ (Y i ) has full support, that is, for all y i ∈ Y i and a ∈ A,
Quality of monitoring
over the joint signals of the players j = i. The quality of a monitoring structure q is defined as
where μ − ν TV denotes the total variation distance between the probability measures μ and ν. 11 It is intuitively clear that when the quality of monitoring is poor, it is hard for players other than i to detect a deviation by i.
Coarse correlated equilibrium
The distribution α ∈ (A) is a coarse correlated equilibrium (CCE) of G if for all i and all a i ∈ A i ,
where α −i ∈ (A −i ) denotes the marginal distribution of α over A −i (see Moulin and Vial 1978) . The notion of a CCE is best understood by contrasting it with the notion of a classical correlated equilibrium (CE). A correlated equilibrium can be thought of as a mediated solution: a mediator draws a joint action a ∈ A from a distribution α ∈ (A) and sends a private recommendation to each player. The distribution α constitutes a CE if for every a in the support of α, no player can gain by choosing a different action than the one recommended. A coarse correlated equilibrium α can also be thought of as a mediated solution but with commitment: the players have to decide whether to sign on to the mediated solution without knowing anything other than the distribution α. A CCE involves greater commitment on the part of the players than does a CE: they agree to play according to a joint agreement α knowing nothing else. 12 11 The total variation distance between two probability measures μ and ν on X is defined as μ − ν TV = 1 2 x∈X |μ(x) − ν(x)|. This is, of course, equivalent to the metric derived from the L 1 norm. 12 Further discussion along these lines can be found in Moulin et al. (2014) .
Define ε-CCE(G) = {u(α) ∈ F : α is an ε-CCE of G} to be the set of ε-coarse correlated equilibrium payoffs of G.
Repeated game
We study an infinitely repeated version of G, denoted by G δ , defined as follows. Time is discrete and indexed by t = 1 2 and in each period t, the game G is played. Payoffs in the repeated game G δ are discounted averages of per-period payoffs using the common discount factor δ ∈ (0 1). To be precise, if the sequence of actions taken is (a 1 a 2 ), player i's ex ante expected payoff is (1 − δ) t δ t u i (a t ). A (behavioral) strategy for player i in the game G δ is a sequence of functions
Hence, a strategy determines a player's current, possibly mixed, action as a function of his private history, i.e., his own past actions and past signals.
Repeated game with communication
We also study a version of 
Equilibrium notion
We consider sequential equilibria of the two games. For G δ , the repeated game without communication, the full support condition (1) ensures that the set of sequential equilibrium payoffs coincides with the set of Nash equilibrium payoffs (see Sekiguchi 1997) . In both situations, we suppose that players have access to public randomization devices.
Some examples
Before beginning a formal analysis of equilibrium payoffs in the repeated game G δ and its counterpart with communication, G com δ , it will be instructive to consider a few examples. The first example illustrates, in the simplest terms, the main result of the paper.
The other examples then point to some complexities. A word of warning is in order. All of the following examples have the property that the marginal distributions of players' signals are the same regardless of players' actions. This means that the expected payoff functions u i (a) cannot be derived from underlying ex post payoff functions w i (a i y i ) and, of course, expected payoffs are not observed. The examples have this property only to illustrate some features of the model in the simplest way possible. This is not essential: the examples can easily be amended so that underlying ex post payoff functions, which are observed, exist.
Example 1 (Communication is necessary for cooperation). Consider the following prisoners' dilemma as the stage game with expected payoffs:
Each player has two possible signals y and y , and suppose that the monitoring structure q is 
where ¬cc denotes any action profile other than cc. ♦
We argue below that without communication, it is impossible for players to "cooperate," that is, to play cc, and that the unique equilibrium payoff is (0 0). With communication, however, it is possible for the players to cooperate (with high probability) and, in fact, attain average payoffs close to (2 2).
The monitoring structure here has two key features. First, the marginal distributions q i (· | a) are identical no matter what action a is played, so that the quality of monitoring η (defined in (2)) is zero. Second, if cc is played, each player's signal is very informative about the other player's signal. If something other than cc is played, a player's signal is completely uninformative about the other player's signal. 13 At the end of this example, we derive this monitoring structure from more basic considerations. To see that these strategies constitute an equilibrium, note first that if all past reports have agreed and a player has played c in the current period, then there is no incentive to misreport one's signal. Misreporting only increases the probability of triggering a punishment from 2ε to 1 2 and so there is no gain from deviating during the communication phase.
Finally, if all past reports agreed, a player cannot gain by deviating by playing d. Such a deviation will trigger a punishment with probability 1 2 , no matter what he reports in the communication phase. It is routine to verify that when ε is small, this is not profitable. Each player's payoff in this equilibrium is
which converges to 2 as ε converges to 0. The monitoring structure in this example can be derived from more basic considerations, as outlined in the Introduction. Suppose that there are two equally likely states of nature ω and ω , and players get a noisy private signal y or y about the state. Conditional on the state, players' signals are independent. If a player plays c in state ω , then he receives signal y with probability 1 − λ > 1 2 and signal y with probability λ. Likewise, if a player plays c in state ω , then he receives y with probability 1 − λ and y with probability λ. Alternatively, if a player plays d, then the two signals are equally likely regardless of state. Thus, cooperating provides information about the state whereas defecting does not. A routine computation shows that the monitoring structure in (4) results for ε = λ(1 − λ).
Example 2 (Cooperation is impossible even with communication). The first example exhibited some circumstances in which cooperation was not possible without communication, but with communication, it was. Does communication always facilitate cooperation? As the next example shows, this is not always the case: the signal structure q matters.
Consider the prisoners' dilemma of Example 1 again, but with the "flipped" signal structure The marginal distribution of signals q i (· | a) is, as before, unaffected by players' actions: η is zero again. But now the signal distribution when dd is played is more informative than when any other action is played; in fact, the former is completely informative. Suppose that there is an equilibrium with communication in which after some history, player 1 is supposed to play c with probability 1 and report his signal truthfully. Suppose player 1 plays d instead of c and at the communication stage, regardless of his private signal, reports with probability 1 2 that his signal was y and with probability 1 2 that his signal was y . Now regardless of whether player 2 plays c or d in that period, the joint distribution over player 1's reports and player 2's signals is the same as if player 1 had played c; that is, q(· | ¬dd). Thus, player 1 can deviate and lie in a way that his deviation cannot be statistically detected. 15 Thus, with the flipped monitoring structure, no cooperation is possible even with communication. A fortiori, no cooperation is possible without communication either. In this example, therefore, communication is unable to facilitate cooperation.
Example 3 (Communication is not necessary for cooperation). Our final example illustrates the possibility that full cooperation is possible without communication even though monitoring is very poor, in fact, nonexistent. 16 Consider the following version of rock-paper-scissors: r p s r 10, 10 0, 11 11, 0 p 11, 0 10, 10 0, 11 s 0, 11 11, 0 10, 10
The stage game has a unique correlated equilibrium, and hence a unique Nash equilibrium as well, in which players randomize equally among the three actions and a payoff of ( 7 7 In what follows, we say that the players are coordinated if they take the same action and so the resulting signal distribution is q(· | a 1 = a 2 ); otherwise, they are said to be miscoordinated.
Consider the following strategy. In period 1, play r. In period t, play action a ∈ {r p s} if the signal received in the last period was y a .
The average payoff from this strategy is clearly 10 since the players are always coordinated. Now suppose player 1 deviates once from the prescribed strategy and then reverts back to it. Player 1's immediate payoff from the deviation is 11, but the deviation also causes the players to become miscoordinated. So no matter what signal player 1 receives, player 2 is equally likely to play each of his actions. As a result, once the players are miscoordinated, the continuation payoff is
This is because with probability 1 3 , the players will become coordinated again in the next period and then remain coordinated thereafter. With probability 1 3 , they will remain miscoordinated, and player 1 will get 11 and then the continuation payoff w; with probability 1 3 , he will get 0 and then w again. Thus the continuation payoff after miscoordination is
The original deviation is not profitable as long as
and this holds as long as δ ≥ 3 11 . The one-deviation principle for games with private monitoring (Mailath and Samuelson 2006, p. 397) then ensures that the prescribed strategies constitute an equilibrium. The example thus demonstrates that in a repeated setting, players can sometimes achieve outcomes far superior to the set of correlated equilibria of the stage game even though there is zero monitoring.
Equilibrium without communication
In this section, we develop a method to bound the set of equilibrium payoffs in games with private monitoring. We show that the set of equilibrium payoffs of the repeated game without communication G δ is contained within the set of ε-coarse correlated equilibrium payoffs of the stage game G. In our result, we give an explicit formula for ε involving (a) the discount factor and (b) the quality of monitoring (as defined in (2)).
The main result of this section is the following proposition.
Proposition 4.1. For any game and any monitoring structure,
The proposition is of independent interest because repeated games with private monitoring do not have a natural recursive structure and so a characterization of the set of equilibrium payoffs seems intractable. So one is left with the task of finding effective bounds for this set. Proposition 4.1 provides such a bound and one that is easy to compute explicitly: the set ε-CCE is defined by i |A i | linear inequalities. Moreover, the bound does not use any detailed information about the monitoring structure; it depends only on the monitoring quality parameter η. 17 Proposition 4.1 relates Nash equilibria of the repeated game to coarse correlated equilibria of the one-shot game. It is clear that the signals that players receive result in their actions being correlated and so the relationship to some mediated solution is not unnatural. To see why CCE is the right notion, consider a monitoring technology for which η = 0, that is, a situation in which player i's actions do not affect the distribution of signals of other players. This means, of course, that any deviation by player i will go undetected. Consider a repeated game equilibrium strategy that is stationary and so results in a fixed distribution of actions α ∈ (A) in every period. Because deviations cannot be detected, each player i can guarantee that his or her payoff is max a i u i (a i α −i ), which implies immediately that α must be a coarse correlated equilibrium. The formal proof below allows for both η > 0 as well as nonstationary strategies.
The "ε-coarse correlated equilibrium" in the statement cannot simply be replaced with "ε-correlated equilibrium." To be precise, if the set of ε-correlated equilibrium payoffs of G is denoted by ε-CE(G), then the statement NE(G δ ) ⊆ ε-CE(G) is false for the same value of ε as above. For instance, in Example 3, the set of correlated equilibrium payoffs is a singleton CE(G) = {(7 7)}, while the set of coarse correlated equilibria is as depicted in Figure 1 . For the monitoring structure in Example 3, η = 0 and, hence, ε = 0 as well. But for δ ≥ Figure 1 . Rock-paper-scissors: CE = (7 7) and CCE is the shaded area.
Sketch of the Proof of Proposition 4.1. We indicated how the CCE bound arises naturally when there is zero monitoring (η = 0) and the equilibrium strategy of the repeated game is stationary. We now show how the argument is extended to permit both η > 0 and nonstationary strategies. So consider strategy profile σ of the repeated game with a payoff v(σ) that is not an ε-CCE payoff in the one-shot game. Suppose that some player i deviates to a strategy σ i in which i chooses a i in every period regardless of history; that is, σ i consists of a permanent deviation to a i . We decompose the (possible) gain from such a deviation into two bits. Consider a fictitious situation in which the players j = i are replaced by a nonresponsive "machine" that, in every period, and regardless of history, plays the ex ante distribution α t −i ∈ (A −i ) that would have resulted from the candidate strategy σ. In the fictitious situation, player i's deviation is unpunished in the sense that the machine continues to play as if no deviation had occurred. Note that this lack of response is what would have occurred if η were zero. We can then write
The first component on the right-hand side represents the payoff difference from facing the real players j = i versus facing the nonresponsive machine. If σ −i is an effective deterrent to the permanent deviation, then this should be negative, and in Lemma 4.1 we calculate a lower bound to this loss. The second component is the gain to player i when his permanent deviation goes unpunished. As we show below in Lemma 4.2, this gain can be related to the coarse correlated equilibria of the one-shot game (see (3)). The lemma establishes that a permanent deviation, which is, of course, stationary, is best deterred by a stationary distribution.
Nonresponsive strategies
We begin with a formal definition of the nonresponsive strategy played by the fictitious machine. Given a strategy profile σ, the induced ex ante distribution over A in period t
and the corresponding marginal distribution over A −i in period t is
where the expectation is defined by the probability distribution over t − 1 histories determined by σ. Note that α −i depends on the whole strategy profile σ and not just on the strategies σ −i of players other than i. Note also that because players' histories are correlated, it is typically the case that α t −i (σ) / ∈ j =i (A j ). Given σ, let α −i (σ) denote the (correlated) strategy of players j = i in which they play α t −i (σ) in period t following any t − 1 period history. The strategy α −i , which is merely a sequence {α t −i } of joint distributions in (A −i ), replicates the ex ante distribution of actions of players j = i resulting from σ, but is nonresponsive to histories.
We now proceed to decompose the gain from a permanent deviation.
Loss from punishment
In this subsection we provide a bound on the absolute value of v i (σ i σ −i ) − v i (σ i α −i ), the difference in payoffs between being punished by strategy σ −i of the real players j = i versus not being punished by the fictitious machine. It is clear that the magnitude of this difference depends crucially on how responsive σ −i is compared to the α −i and this, in turn, depends on how well the players j = i can detect i's permanent deviation. We show below that this loss can, in fact, be bounded by a quantity that is a positive linear function of η. Moreover, the bound is increasing in δ. The following result provides an exact formula for the trade-off between the quality of monitoring and the discount factor. Lemma 4.1. Suppose i plays a i always. The difference in i's payoff when others play σ −i versus when they play the nonresponsive strategy α −i derived from σ satisfies
See Appendix A for the proof.
Gain when unpunished
We now relate the second component in (5) to the ε-coarse correlated equilibria of the one-shot game (see (3)). We begin by characterizing the set of ε-CCE payoffs. For any v ∈ F , define
where β −i ∈ (A −i ) denotes the marginal distribution of β over A −i . In words, no matter how the payoff v is achieved via a correlated action, at least one player can gain at least (v) by deviating. It is easy to see that v ∈ ε-CCE(G) if and only if (v) ≤ ε. This is because (v) ≤ ε is the same as the following statement: there exists a β ∈ (A) satisfying u(β) = v such that
and this is equivalent to v ∈ ε-CCE(G).
Note that (v) is also the value of an artificial two-person zero-sum game in which player I ("deviator") chooses a pair (i a i ) and player II ("mediator") chooses a joint distribution β ∈ (A) such that u(β) = v. The idea is that the mediator chooses a joint distribution and the deviator chooses a player and a pure strategy for that player as a deviation. The payoff to player I is then u i (a i β −i ) − u i (β). The fact that (v) ≤ 0 is the same as v ∈ CCE(G) is analogous to a result of Hart and Schmeidler (1989) on correlated equilibria.
The following important result shows that the function , which measures the static incentives to deviate, also measures the dynamic incentives to permanently deviate from a nonresponsive strategy. Formally, consider a dynamic analogue δ of the twoperson zero-sum game outlined above. In δ , player I (deviator) chooses a pair (i σ i ), where σ i denotes the constant sequence a i (a permanent deviation) and player II (mediator) chooses a nonresponsive strategy, that is, a sequence of joint distributions α ∈ (A) ∞ , such that its discounted average v(α) = v. The payoff to player I in δ is v i (σ i α −i ) − v i (α). Lemma 4.1 shows that the value of , that is, (v), is also the value of δ . This relies on the fact that the deviation is permanent (stationary). Since the maximized payoff function of player I is convex in player II's strategy, player II's optimal response is stationary as well. This last step resembles the familiar consumption smoothing argument.
Lemma 4.2. The value
subject to the constraint that the discounted average payoff from α is v(α) = v where v i (σ i α −i ) is i's payoff when he plays a i always and others play the nonresponsive strategy
Proof. It is clear that (v) is at least as large as the right-hand side of the equality above. This is because the set of strategies available to player II in δ includes all stationary strategies and the latter are equivalent to all strategies in . The set of strategies available to player I in and δ are the same.
where the second inequality follows from the definition of θ i . Now since θ i (· a i ) is convex, 18 it is the case that a solution to the problem
is to set v t = v for all t. Thus, we have that
which when combined with (6) yields that for all i and a i ,
This implies that
and, thus,
Applying the minmax theorem Sion (1958) in the game δ on the left-hand side and in the game on the right-hand side, we obtain
Payoff bound
With Lemmas 4.1 and 4.2 in hand, we can now complete the proof of the result (Proposition 4.1) that the set of Nash equilibrium payoffs of the repeated game is contained in the set of ε-coarse correlated equilibrium payoffs of the one-shot game. Suppose σ is a strategy profile in 
Thus, σ is not a Nash equilibrium of G δ . This completes the proof of Proposition 4.1.
Bound comparison
The bound in Proposition 4.1 is related to, but (weakly) tighter than, the bound obtained in our earlier work, Awaya and Krishna (2016) , which is called the bound, as it depends on a function defined there. The bound was obtained by considering a permanent deviation to a single deviating action a i = a BR i , a one-period best response to a * that uniquely achieves an efficient payoff u * . The new CCE bound derived in this section also considers a permanent deviation, but both the identity of the deviator i and the deviating action a i are chosen optimally.
In the prisoners' dilemma, there is no difference in the bounds, but in many other games, the resulting improvement can be substantial. is played, player 1 has the incentive to deviate to d, and when (c c) is played, player 2 has the incentive to deviate to d. The bound does not allow the deviator to be chosen dependent on which of (b b) and (c c) is played: the single deviator must be chosen once and for all. Thus, the bound underestimates the incentive to deviate. In this game, however, the unique CCE payoff is (0 0) and the highest symmetric ε-CCE payoff is (16ε 16ε). Proposition 4.1 now implies that equilibrium payoffs of the repeated game satisfy
The improvement in the bound can be calculated in any game (both the function and the set of CCE payoffs can be computed via linear programs). To get some sense of the improvement in a game of economic interest, consider a duopoly in which firms compete by setting prices for differentiated products. This was the model studied in Awaya and Krishna (2016) . Suppose that the firms' demands are linear in prices: for i = 1 2 and j = i,
where b > 1. Note that since b > 1, the own-price effect on a firm's demand is greater than the cross-price effect. In this example, the difference in total profits given by the two bounds when there is zero monitoring (η = 0) can be obtained in closed form:
The bound for this game can be calculated using the derivation in Awaya and Krishna (2016, p. 305 ). In the case of linear demand, the set of CCE of this game coincides with the unique Nash equilibrium (see Gérard-Varet and Moulin 1978) and is easily calculated.
To get a sense of the improvement, suppose b = 2. Then the bound says that when the monitoring is poor in any equilibrium of the repeated game, the total profits of the two firms cannot exceed approximately 44% of the gap between total monopoly profits and total Nash profits. But the CCE bound is much tighter. It says that with poor monitoring, total profits in any equilibrium cannot exceed approximately 1% of the gap.
Equilibrium with communication
In what follows, we consider efficient actions a * that Pareto dominate some Nash equilibrium of the stage game, that is, u(a * ) u(α N ), where α N ∈ × i (A i ) is a (possibly mixed) Nash equilibrium of the stage game. 19 In Section 5.1, we display a particular strategy profile for the game with communication. Then in Section 5.2, we identify conditions on the signal structure q and the discount factor δ that guarantee that the profile constitutes an equilibrium which is nearly efficient (see Proposition 5.1). We emphasize that our result is not a folk theorem. In the latter, the signal structure is held fixed and the discount factor is raised sufficiently so that any feasible outcome can arise in equilibrium. In our result, the discount factor is held fixed (perhaps at some high level) and the monitoring structure is varied so that efficient outcomes can be sustained in equilibrium.
In what follows, it will be convenient to assume that all players have the same set of signals, that is, for all i and j, Y i = Y j , and without loss of generality, we suppose that for all i, the set of signals Y i = {1 2 K}.
A simple equilibrium
We now construct a nearly efficient equilibrium with communication. Define Y D to be the set of (diagonal) signal profiles such that y 1 = y 2 = · · · = y n , that is, profiles in which all players' signals are the same. The proposed equilibrium strategy resembles a trigger strategy and is very simple: In period 1, play a * i and report the signal received truthfully. In any period t > 1, play a * i and report the signal y t i truthfully if all players have reported the same signal in all past periods, that is, if all players have reported the same signal in every period s < t, that is, if for all s < t, y s ∈ Y D . Otherwise, play the one-shot Nash action α The strategy thus requires that all players unanimously agree on a signal so as to continue cooperating. Any dissent results in infinite punishment. Another way to write this, useful for later comparisons, is that the strategy calls on players to cooperate in period t if and only if I Y D (y s ) = 1 in all periods s < t, where I Y D is the indicator function of the set of diagonal profiles Y D .
Fix the set of signal distributions {q(· | a) : a = a * } and suppose that for all a = a * , q * (· | a) has full support.
As a first step, consider a signal distribution q * = q(· | a * ) that is degenerate on signal profiles in which all the players' signals agree and assigns positive probability to all such profiles. Formally, q * (y) > 0 if and only if y 1 = y 2 = · · · = y n . We call such a distribution perfectly informative since any player's signal provides perfect information about others' signals. Thus, the terminology is consistent with that of Blackwell (1951) .
First, suppose that all players follow the suggested strategies. Then the payoff of player i is u i (a * ) since punishments are never triggered. We now argue that if no one has deviated until now, then no player has any incentive (i) to misreport his signal or (ii) to deviate to another action.
Suppose that the suggested strategies are being played and we are in a situation in which in all past periods, players' reports have agreed. If player i plays a * i in period t and then receives the signal y i , she is sure that all other players' signals are the same as hers. Reporting y i truthfully is then strictly better than reporting any other signal since doing the latter is sure to trigger a punishment. Thus, no player has the incentive to lie along the equilibrium path. After a disagreement, the play is independent of the reports.
Finally, provided that the discount factor is high enough, no player has any incentive to deviate if we are along the equilibrium path. This is because following any deviation to a i = a * i , the distribution q(· | a i a * −i ) will assign positive probability to all signal profiles and, in particular, to profiles where not all signals agree. Thus any deviation will trigger punishment with positive probability: even by optimally tailoring her report following a deviation, a player cannot reduce this to zero. Provided the discount factor is high enough, no deviation will be profitable and all the incentives can be made strict.
Thus we have argued that if q * is perfectly informative, there is a high enough discount factor so that the repeated game with communication has an equilibrium that is fully efficient. Now suppose that q * is nearly informative in the sense that it is close to a perfectly informative distribution q 0 . Then by continuity we obtain the following proposition.
Proposition 5.1. Fix {q(· | a) : a = a * }. There exists a δ such that for all δ > δ and for all perfectly informative q 0 ∈ (Y ), there exists a γ such that if q 0 − q * TV < γ, there is a nearly efficient equilibrium of the game with communication.
Note that the distributions q(· | a) for a = a * are fixed and it is only q(· | a * ) that is required to be nearly informative. 20 Some shortcomings of the equilibrium The equilibrium constructed above, however, has some shortcomings. First, with the suggested strategies, the likelihood that cooperation may break down even though no one has deviated may be substantial: players will revert to noncooperation whenever there is any discrepancy in the reported signals. Such discrepancies occur, with probability γ, even if all players have conformed to the equilibrium strategy. Second, the strategies guarantee truth-telling only when q 0 − q * TV is small, that is, when q * is very close to being perfectly informative.
The first deficiency is particularly acute when the number of signals or the number of players is large. The probability that the signals of the two players are the same is clearly zero and so the probability of continuing cooperation is zero as well. A discrete approximation to the continuous distribution will have the property that the probability of cooperation is small. A similar phenomenon arises with a large number of players (for a fixed signal generating process). As an example, suppose the set of signals for all n players is Y i = {1 2} and players' signals are independent conditional on an underlying state ω ∈ {ω 1 ω 2 }. Given ω = ω k , each player independently receives the signal k with probability 1 − λ > 0 5 and the other signal 3 − k with probability λ. Routine calculations show that the probability of continuing to play a * if no one has deviated so far is (1 − λ) n + λ n , which decreases rapidly to zero as the number of players n increases.
(ii) The magnitude of the second deficiency can be seen by considering the following example. Suppose that Y i = {1 2 3} and the joint distribution of signals is, for
For this joint distribution, the indicator function (or unanimity rule) does not induce truth-telling no matter how small the value of ε is. This is because for all ε, q * (2 2) < q * (1 2) and so a player receiving the signal y i = 2 would be better off reporting z i = 1. The reason is that if we fix a q 0 satisfying q 0 (y) > 0 if and only if all signals in y agree, then for any ε, the total variation distance between q * and q 0 is at least 1 2 q 0 (2 2).
We now construct a different equilibrium that is not subject to these deficiencies.
Another equilibrium
As before, the new strategy profile is also similar to the trigger strategy above but with a different trigger. The play in any period is governed by a state variable that takes on two values-"normal" and "punishment." The players' strategies depend only on the state: if the state in period t is normal, play a * i ; if the state is punishment, play the one-shot Nash action α N . The state transitions from period t to t + 1 are determined solely by the players' reports of their signals in period t.
The initial state, in period 1, is normal. If the state is normal in period t and the players report signals y at the end of the period, then the probability that the state remains normal in period t + 1 is p * (y); how the reports y are aggregated to yield p * (y) is specified in detail below. The punishment state is absorbing: if the state is punishment in any period, it remains so in every subsequent period. Unlike the indicator function used in the previous subsection, here the probability of punishment is not just 0 and 1. Following a vector of reports, the probability of punishment could be positive but not 1.
It is simplest to suppose that following the exchange of signals, for every y ∈ Y , players have access to a public correlation device (a biased coin) that indicates whether the state is normal (with probability p * (y)) or punishment (with probability 1 − p * (y)). In fact, the public correlation device can be replicated by face-to-face communication by making use of jointly controlled lotteries, as in Aumann, Maschler and Stearns (1995) .
Specifically, for all i, consider the following strategy (σ * i ρ * i ) in the repeated game with communication. The set of messages is the same as the set of signals, that is,
The actions chosen according to σ * i are as follows:
• In period 1, choose a * i .
• In any period t > 1, if the state is normal, choose a t i = a * i ; otherwise, choose α N i .
The messages sent according to ρ * i are as follows:
• In any period t ≥ 1, if the action chosen is a t i = a * i , then report m t i = y t i .
• In any period t ≥ 1, if the action chosen is a t i = a i = a * i and the signal received is y i , then report m t i ∈ arg max
, where the expectation is taken with respect to the distribution q(· | (a i a * −i )).
We will show that there exists a score function p * (y) with the following key properties:
(a) Along the equilibrium path, p * induces truthful reporting of signals.
(b) If a player deviates from a * i in the normal state, then the expected value of p * falls (the probability of going to the punishment state increases) regardless of his or her report.
(c) If the signals are close to being perfectly informative along the equilibrium path, then the probability of punishment is small.
The first two properties are required for the strategies outlined above to constitute an equilibrium. The third property guarantees that the equilibrium is nearly efficient. Figure 2 is a schematic depiction of the play resulting from the given strategies.
Until now we have made no assumptions about the signals and their distribution. In particular, the bound on payoffs without communication, obtained in the previous section, applies without any specific assumptions about the signal structure. In this section, however, we use some specific features of the signals: that the distribution q * = q(· | a * ) is "positively correlated" in a sense made precise subsequently.
Recall that the set of signals of any player is Y i = {1 2 K} and that this has a natural order. Denote by E * all expectations with respect to q * . We suppose that for all i and j,
is a strictly increasing function of y i . 21 We now study circumstances in which the strategies given above constitute an equilibrium. This involves two steps. First, we construct a particular score function p * and show that a player who conforms to the equilibrium strategy has no incentive to lie in the communication stage. Next, we show that no player has any incentive to deviate from the given strategy determined by the particular score function p * . 
Optimality of reports
We now turn to the construction of a score function p * , which will be used to support the equilibrium with communication. This requires that players have the incentive to report their signals truthfully.
Given q * ∈ (Y ), consider a payoff function P * : Y → R, which is common for all players, defined by
where E * is the expectation operator with respect to the distribution q * . We argue that if all players have the same payoff P * (y) when the reports are y, then they have the incentive to report truthfully. The function P * is thus a potential function as in Monderer and Shapley (1996) . Some understanding of the function may be obtained by considering the case of two players and suppose player 1's true signal is y i = k. The difference in P * if player 1, say, reports y i = k + 1 rather than y i = k, is then
and this represents the error in player 1's forecast-the conditional expectation-of player 2's signal averaged over y 1 = k and y 1 = k + 1. Player 1's expected gain from reporting k + 1 versus k conditional on his true signal is
and since the conditional expectations-the forecasts-are increasing in his own signal, this is not profitable if the payoffs are given by P * . Similarly, reporting k − 1 is not profitable either and condition (8) guarantees that large deviations are unprofitable as well. Proposition B.1 in Appendix B shows formally that if q * ∈ int (Y ) satisfies (8), then each player has a strict incentive to tell the truth if others are doing so. The normalized version of P * , called the score function, is
where min P * (resp. max P * ) denotes the minimum (resp. maximum) value of P * over Y . Since Y is finite, the minimum and maximum exist, and because of Proposition B.1, max P * > min P * . Thus, for all y, p * (y) ∈ [0 1]. Note that p * is just an affine transformation of P * and so players' incentives are not affected by this renormalization.
Optimality of actions
Having shown that if a player has not deviated, then it is optimal to report truthfully, we now turn to the optimality of actions. We first show that it is optimal to follow the suggested strategies in the limit case where the distribution q * = q(· | a * ) is perfectly informative: a player's signal gives precise information about others' signals. We then show that the same is true if q * is near a perfectly informative distribution.
A limit case Recall that a distribution q ∈ (Y ) is perfectly informative if q(y) > 0 if and only if y 1 = y 2 = · · · = y n . When the distribution is perfectly informative, then every player's individual signal provides perfect information about the signals of the other players. Now consider the function
and note that P 0 is just P * when the signals are perfectly correlated. Now suppose player i deviates to a i in period t and thereby induces the signal distribution q = q(· | a i a * −i ). Denote by E all expectations with respect to the new signal distribution q with full support over Y . Further suppose that after the deviation, player i follows the strategy of reporting that his signal is z i (y i ) when it is actually y i . Denoting by p 0 the normalized version of P 0 (analogous to (10)), it is easy to verify that no matter what reporting strategy z i the deviating player follows, the expected score is
because we have assumed that q has full support, and so E[(z i ( y i ) − y j ) 2 ] > 0 and min P 0 < 0. Player i's expected payoff from such a deviation is, therefore,
and this is strictly smaller than u i (a * ) once δ is large enough. Choose δ i such that all possible deviations a i = a * i and all misreporting strategies z i for i are unprofitable. Since both the actions and the signals are finite in number, such a δ i exists. The same is true for all players j. Let δ = max j δ j . Then we know that for all δ > δ, the proposed strategy profile constitutes an equilibrium. Note that δ depends on the distributions q(· | a) for a = a * and not on q(· | a * ).
Nearly informative signals
We can complete the proof that the given strategies form an equilibrium when q * is nearly informative by appealing to continuity.
Recall that after renormalization, we can suppose that each Y i = {1 2 K}. Recall that Y D denotes the set of all diagonal profiles, that is, profiles in which all players get the same signal and that a perfectly informative distribution q 0 ∈ (Y ) is one where q 0 (y) > 0 if and only if y ∈ Y D . Let Q 0 ⊂ (Y ) be the set of all perfectly informative distributions.
Fix q(· | a * ) ≡ q * ∈ int (Y ). First, find a perfectly informative distribution q 0 ∈ Q 0 such that
It is routine to verify that
the total probability mass that q * assigns to nondiagonal signal profiles. Moreover, γ = q * − q TV for any q ∈ Q 0 such that for all y ∈ Y D , q(y) ≥ q * (y). Thus, in the total variation metric, q * is equidistant from any perfectly informative distribution, which places greater probability mass on all diagonal profiles. This means that given q * ∈ int (Y ), we can always choose a q 0 such that q 0 (y) > 0 for all y ∈ Y D . Now as γ → 0, Lemma B.1 in Appendix B guarantees that for all y ∈ Y , the score functions
and so
as well. Moreover,
Let v * i denote player i's payoff in the equilibrium described above. Then we have that
Thus, there exists a γ such that for all γ < γ, for all i,
We have established the strategies using that the score function also constitute an equilibrium, thereby providing a different proof of Proposition 5.1 (under the additional condition that E * [ y j | y i ] is increasing). Of course, the threshold values δ and γ will be different than if the simple equilibrium construction were used.
Some advantages of the score function The equilibrium construction using the score function p * overcomes some of the difficulties associated with the equilibrium using indicator function I Y D . First, the score function is more forgiving: a slight discrepancy in the reported signals only increases the probability of punishment slightly. Second, and perhaps more important, the score function guarantees truth-telling along the path even if q * is far from being perfectly informative (assuming, of course, that E * [ y j | y i ] is strictly increasing). The indicator function guarantees truth-telling only when q * is nearly informative. Specifically, the following statements hold: (i) When there is a continuum of signals and q * has a positive density everywhere, cooperation breaks down immediately if players use the indicator function to decide on future play. This does not happen if future play is decided using the score function: now a slight disagreement in reports results in only a slight increase in the probability of future cooperation. Similarly, with a large number of players, the indicator function results in a rapid breakdown of cooperation. Again this is not the case with the score function.
(ii) Recall that for the q * defined in (7), the indicator function cannot induce truthtelling no matter how small ε is. But the score function for this example is and this induces truth-telling for all ε < 1 21 (this ensures that E * [ y j | y i ] is increasing). Moreover, the conclusion of Proposition 5.1 obtains (even though q * does not converge to a perfectly informative q 0 as ε goes to zero since q * (2 2) → 0).
Benefits of communication
Suppose that a * is an efficient action and u(a * ) u(α N ), where α N is a Nash equilibrium of the one-shot game. The result below provides conditions under which payoffs close to u(a * ) can be achieved with communication and not without. This requires the game to not have an efficient coarse correlated equilibrium. 22 The first condition ensures that the bound developed in Proposition 4.1 is useful; that is, if the quality of monitoring is zero (η = 0), equilibrium welfare without communication is bounded away from efficient payoffs u(a * ). Proposition 5.1 provides conditions under which there exists an equilibrium with communication in which players report their signals truthfully. When q(· | a * ) is perfectly informative, the equilibrium with communication results in payoffs equal to u(a * ). We then have the following theorem. 22 Most games of interest, such as the prisoners' dilemma, chicken, Cournot oligopoly (with discrete quantities), and Bertrand with or without differentiated products, satisfy the condition. Alternatively, the rock-paper-scissors game in Example 3 does not satisfy the condition. In that example, α(rr) = α(pp) = α(ss) = Theorem 6.1. Fix {q(· | a) : a = a * } and let δ be defined by (11) . For any δ > δ, there exist η and γ such that if the quality of monitoring (see (2)) η < η and the informativeness of q(· | a * ) (see (12)), γ < γ, then there is an equilibrium with communication whose welfare exceeds that from any equilibrium without communication.
Note that since q(· | a) for all a = a * remain fixed and q * becomes increasingly correlated as γ goes to zero, the conditions of the theorem guarantee that signals are more informative at a * than at actions a = a * . This feature of the signal structure is stronger than is necessary for the theorem to hold. In particular, it would be enough that q * is more correlated than q(· | a i a * −i ) for all i and all a i = a * i . This is because only unilateral deviations need to be considered. But as Example 2 shows, to obtain the conclusion of the theorem, these features of the signal structure cannot be dispensed with entirely. We end with an example where the mechanics of Theorem 6.1 can be seen at work. The parameter γ is such that q * − q 0 TV = γ, where q 0 is a perfectly informative distribution that places equal weight only on the diagonal elements. The parameter η < 1 3 is such that for both i, q * i − q i TV = η. Affiliation requires that γ < 
No-communication bound
For the prisoners' dilemma, the set of ε-coarse correlated equilibrium payoffs is depicted in Figure 3 . From Proposition 4.1, it follows that in any equilibrium of G δ , i.e., the repeated game without communication, symmetric equilibrium payoffs v 1 = v 2 satisfy
Equilibrium with communication
Routine calculations show that for the monitoring structure given above, the score function p * : and so the expected score if no one deviates is E * [p * ( y)] = 1 − 3 4 γ. Using (13), we then obtain that the payoff in the equilibrium constructed in Section 5 is
Note that if instead of the score function p * , we required that signals match in order to continue cooperating (as in Section 5.1), then the probability of continuation, 1 − γ, would be lower than with the score function. The resulting equilibrium payoff would be lower as well.
If player 1, say, deviates from cc in a normal state, then regardless of his true signal, it is best for him to report y 1 = y in the communication phase (assuming that both γ and η are small, specifically, 4η + 3γ < 2). This implies that after a deviation, the probability of the state being normal in the next period is
When used in (14), this implies that the suggested strategies form an equilibrium if and only if
Using the expressions derived above, it is easy to verify that a necessary condition for this to hold is that δ ≥ 
Payoff comparison
For there to be gains from communication, i.e., equilibrium payoffs from communication exceed those from no communication, it is sufficient that Figure 4 depicts the set of parameters (γ η) for which both B ≥ 0 (below the B = 0 curve) and C ≥ 0 (left of the C = 0 curve) as the shaded region labelled R. For (γ η) ∈ R, there is an equilibrium with communication whose payoffs exceed the Figure 4 . In Example 4, if δ = 0 8, the conclusion of Theorem 6.1 holds when the monitoring structure is in R.
no-communication bound. For instance, if γ = 0 02 = η, equilibrium payoffs without communication are at most 0 768, whereas with communication, there is an equilibrium with payoffs of 1 887.
Our main result requires poor monitoring without communication (small η) and high correlation of signals when the actions are efficient (small γ). The roles of the two parameters are apparent in the example. A small η, of course, results in a tighter bound on the set of equilibrium payoffs without communication. A small γ has two beneficial effects when communication is possible. First, it means that the probability of staying on the equilibrium path when no one has deviated is close to 1 (in the example, it is 1 − 3 4 γ). Second, a small γ increases the ability of players to detect deviations. A measure of this detection ability is E * [p * ( y)] − max z 1 E[p * (z 1 ( y 1 ) y 2 )] = 1 24 (2 − 3γ)(2 − 3η) and this is a decreasing function of γ. This illustrates how communication improves monitoring when η and γ are small.
Conclusion
The general methodology of this paper is to compare the set of equilibria under two regimes: a base case without communication and an alternative regime in which players can communicate. This methodology can be used in a variety of applications. As already mentioned in the Introduction, one may ask whether and to what extent subjective peer evaluations incentivize workers. The general methodology-especially using payoff bounds developed in Section 4-can also be used to address issues other than communication. Antitrust authorities in many countries are interested in the effects of multi-market interaction among conglomerates. One may ask what the social loss from such multi-market contact is. There is a substantial literature on this subject, but most of it supposes that conglomerates can perfectly monitor each other. With perfect monitoring, however, multi-market contact seems to have minimal effects. 23 How and whether multi-market contact facilitates collusion in a private monitoring setup is an open question, which may be addressed by first using our CCE-bound on profits without such contact and then seeing whether there are equilibria with multi-market contact that are better for the conglomerates.
Appendix A: No-communication bound
This appendix contains the proof of Lemma 4.1 from Section 4, which provides an estimate of the loss from punishment. In other words, it measures the payoff difference to a permanently deviating player from facing the actual strategy versus the fictitious nonresponsive strategy. Each of these generate different distributions over histories and we begin by estimating the distance between these distributions. Lemma A.1 shows that the distance between these distributions grows at most linearly. Lemma A.2 then derives the bound in Lemma 4.1.
For a fixed strategy profile σ, let μ t (h t ) be the probability that a history h t is realized. Then 
Similarly, let μ t be the probability of history h t that results when i permanently deviates to a i , that is, from the strategy profile (σ i σ −i ). Then
Analogously, let μ t −i be the marginal distribution of μ t on player −i's private histories h t −i so that
Proof. The proof is by induction on t. For t = 1, we have 
≤ η
The last inequality follows from our assumption that the quality of the monitoring does not exceed η. Now suppose that the statement of the lemma holds for t − 1. We can write In this appendix, we first show that the score function defined in (9) has the property that every player has the strict incentive to report his private signal truthfully at the communication stage, provided that the player chose a * i , his part of the efficient action a * (see Proposition B.1). 26 A second result, Lemma B.1 below, establishes a continuity result used in the proof of Proposition 5.1. It shows that the score functions associated with distributions that are nearly informative are close to score functions of perfectly informative distributions.
Let Y i = {1 2 K}. Given a distribution q ∈ (Y ), consider the score function (as in (9) as the expectation (with respect to q) of the sum of the other players' choices, conditional on y i = y i . 24 The property that a linear function of the TV distance is an upper bound to the difference in payoffs accounts for the fact that the bound in the statement of Lemma A.1 is linear in this distance. 25 The bound below is, of course, an overestimate, since the TV distance between two measures is always less than or equal to 1. 26 The fact that all players have the same score distinguishes this result from that of Crémer and McLean (1988) .
Suppose all players j = i report truthfully. When player i receives a signal y i and reports y i , his expected score is 27 Thus, upon receiving the signal y i , player i has a strict incentive to report truthfully.
The next result establishes the continuity of score functions in the underlying distributions.
Lemma B.1. Let {q l } ∈ int (Y ) be a sequence such that q l → q 0 and q 0 ∈ (Y ) is a perfectly informative distribution. Then the corresponding score functions p l → p 0 .
Proof. Analogous to (9), we have that Comparing terms in (16) and (17) shows that as q l → q 0 , E l [ y j | y i = x i ] → x i (recall that each x i occurs with positive probability).
Finally, note that since max P 0 − min P 0 > 0, lim(max P l − min P l ) > 0, and lim p l is well defined. Thus, p l (the normalized version of P l ) converges to p 0 (the normalized version of P 0 ) as well.
